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,This is a working paper and should not be quoted or reproduced
in whole or in part without the written consent of the author. The
views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or any other part of the Federal
Reserve System.One of the major advantages cited for more flexible exchange rates is
greater national monetary independence. The official intervention that is required
under fixed exchange rates augments or depletes foreign assets -of the monetary
authorities, changing the international component of the monetary base. With no
such changes under purely floating rates the base money stock is insulated from such
foreign influence. Under fixed rates varying degrees of abililty to sterilize
autonomous international reserve flows -by opposite movement of the domestic
component of base money are possible, and from the other direction autonomous
domestic monetary policy can be thwarted to varying degrees by opposite movements
in the international component of the base. If the exchange rate were deter~ined
solely by private supply and demand, there would be no such effects to consider.
In the early 1970's the international adjustment mechanism for most
major industrialized countries- changed significantly- from the adjustable peg system
that had prevailed throughout the postwar period to one of managed floating, but
regarding the above effects the change can be considered to be one of degree rather
than kind. Although intervention-is not dictated by international rules at a certain
percent either side of an established U.S. dollar parity, a great deal of discretionary_
intervention has occurred frequently during generalized floating. This is true both
for independently floating countries-and f-or those- countries-that---choose- -tofhc: their--
currencies to each other'via arrangements such as -the-European-joint-float~-Figure 1
illustrates, for example, how the increase in foreign official reserves held in the
United States continued to surge as_the U.S. dollar__again came under pressure.Jater..in
the seventies. Even when the oil-producing nation accretions are excluded, the build-
up rivals that earlier in the decade when the Bretton Woods system verged on
collapse. If countries whose currencies were under upward pressure against the U.S.
dollar during this period had difficulty in sterilizing official reserve inflows, their
control over the monetary base could have been less than under fixed rates. InFigure 1
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addition, the increased role of expectations in exchange markets under managed
floating could have caused greater offsetting changes in the international component
of the monetary base resulting from attempts to manipulate the domestic component.
It is not clear a priori, therefore, that greater national monetary
autonomy generally has been achieved by the revocation of intervention limits
against the U.S. dollar. This paper undertakes to measure changes that have occurred
in this regard for fourteen industrialized countries, each of which formerly pegged to
the U.S. dol1ar but which now either float independently or together with other
currencies as a group. Results indicate that greater monetary independence has been
achieved for most countries, but evidence is also presented to suggest that in some
cases managed floating has been characterized more by "management" than
"floating.
1I
,Section I below quite briefly reviews the background, measurement
techniques, and some pitfalls encountered in this area. Empirical methodology to be
applied to all investigated countries is developed in Section II, and Section III presents
empirical results. Implications of these results are summarized in section IV.
I. Background
The empirical literature in this area in recent years has been quite
extensive, developing concurrently with a broader interest in the monetary approach
to international adjustment.!! It has centered basically around the estimation of the
1. For a collection of seminal contributions to the monetary approach, see Frenkel
and Johnson (1976). For surveys see Whitman (I975) and Kreinin and Officer
(J978).3
effect of domestic monetary policy on changes in international reserves (measured by
an "offset coefficient") and the effect of changes in international reserves on
domestic monetary policy (measured by a "sterilization coefficient"). Most applicat-
ions have focused on the pegged exchange rate period, partly because the theory as
originally conceived was assumed to apply to a system of "fixed" rates, and also
because until recently there has not been enough data available on the managed
floating rate period for an adequate comparison of the two regimes.£/ A theoretical
counterpart of the monetary approach under flexible exchange rates concentrates on
exchange rate determination rather than balance of payments determination. The
direction of much empirical research has been shifted from measuring monetary
independence, or absence of it, to investigating determinants of the exchange rates
as asset prices of national money stocks, incorporating both purchasing power parity
2. An adequate survey of empirical work, detailing countries studied, empirical
methodologies, time intervals focused upon,and conclusions regarding monetary:c~ ..
independence, is beyond the scope of this paper. A llst of relevant work that
contains the estimation of some form of either a monetary offseL_or __ a
sterilization relationshlp,or both, would include: Aghevli~and Khan-{1974k--
Argy ane! Kouri (1974), Artus (1976), Bean (1976), ConnallyandTaylor(~7~),
Connally--and Taylor o979t, De--Grauwe (975), De Grauwe (976), Genberg
(1976), Guitian (1976), Girton and Roper (1977), Herring and Marston (1976),
Hickman- and Schleicher-(l979),Hodjera (1976), Kohlhagen (1977), Koning
(1977), Kouri and Porter (1974), Kouri (1975), Luan and Miller (1979), Miller
(1976), Miller (1979), Miller and Askin (1976), Neumann (1978), Porter (1972),
Rousslang (1978), Willms-l!97I), and Zecher (1974k Among the-above,Hickman
and Schleicher -analyze-sterllizationloi" sixteen countries overa-period---:that'
extends into managed floating (1958-1976), but they do not distinguish between
fixed and more flexible exchange rates regimes. Likewise Girton and Roper
analyse-offset--relationships---for--Canada-from 1952 through 1974, during which
the country first floated, then fixed to the U.S. dollar and floated again, but the
different intervals are not segmented. Kohlhagen investigates offsets to
Canadian monetary policy, -fitting data from 1951 through -1970, and dcaes~.
separate the earlier- Canadian float from the fixed rate period of the sixtie5.--------.
Artus estimates a sterilization coefficient for West Germany, focusing
exclusively on the period of managed floating. Other work is concerned with
empirical verification under fixed exchange rates.4
relationships and the role of expectations•.!! But since the managed float is a hybrid
arrangement in reality the former theoretical paradigm still has relevance. Reserve
use under managed floating as llPposed to the adjustable peg system has been the
subject of some research,.!! and is evidence of an awareness that a priori in some
respects we cannot treat a managed float as fundamentally different from an
adjustable peg exchange rate system.
Empirical work in measuring national monetary independence can be
difficult. First, biased offset and sterilization coefficients can result if it is not
recognized that the domestic component of the monetary base and the international
component are simultaneous'functions of each other. Domestic monetary policy can
be an instrument to sterilize international reserve changes but at the same time it
can cause changes in international reserves.~/ Second, neither offsets to domestic
monetary ·policy via changes in foreign reserves nor sterilization of unwanted
exogenous changes in the latter can be addressed without recognition of other goals
of national monetary policy. This underlines the desirability of induding in a model
monetary reaction function targets for the management of both the domestic and the
international component of base money, the purpose being to identify disturbances
and distinguish their effects.§/
3. See, for example, Frenkel (1976) and Keran (1979). For a recent development
of the approach and a survey of empirical work see Bilson (1979).
4. See Williamson (J976), Suss (J976), Heller and Khan (J978), and Frenkel(I978).
5. Some researchers have dealt with this simultaneity by constructing more
complex formal models in which offset and sterilization coefficients are
estimated by techniques such as two stage least squares. While Kouri-Porter
(1974) use ordinary least squares in estimating their offset coefficients for
Australia, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, they derive an expression for
offset coefficient bias if sterilization also occurs, arguing that such bias is
likely to be small as long as their capital flow equation is well specified and as
long as discretionary monetary policy dominates automatic sterilization in the
observed changes in net domestic assets of the central bank.
6. For arguments on the incorporation of monetary reaction functions in this kind
of work, see Sweeney and Willett (1977).5
Third, caution has to be exercised in interpreting results that may have fallen
out from the estimation of accounting identities rather than behavioral
relationships.I' lbisproblem arises from the fact that one reso~ to the balance
sheet of the monetary authorities for data.. If estimations reflect accounting
relationships only, causation or behavioral relationships are obscured. For example,
in a period when the change in the monetary base M is zero, because the base can be
divided into international and domestic components, we have AM -= 0 = AR + AD, so
that ..6R, = -LD. To the extent that this relationship is picked up in time series
estimation, offset and sterilization coefficients will tend toward minus one. These
coefficients may not be equal to one because there is a change in the total monetary
base, butit is important to note how results can be affected by accounting principles
rather than-true economic behavior _
The above points argue against simply fitting concurrent observations of
~hangesin the foreign and domestic assets of the monetary authorities, and certainly
shouJdwam one against:----using-single equation estimations of offset-or sterilization
effects without· taking into:- account other -behavioral relationships----that-affect,·-
domesticorjnternational monetary policy._
The empirical--procedure""_presented~.below_~. aimed_partly -a1: -reducinrth~· -~
problems. Monthly data is regressed usingp.2.lynomial_distributed lags-and targets;-
entering government reaction funC:tions....for....both_.the .conduct.of.domesticJJlonetary----'--.-
policy and exchange rate intervention are used·as--instrumental_variables_--in__a __two_-----:·.c_
stage'-Procedure;->--Whlle -this approach::omay.not_~be.~ ideBrlt'i:loes go-some-mstance-'
toward abstracting from the difficulties that plague work in this area. Instruments
used, moreover, are generally.applicable in both a fixed rate and a managed floating
7. Sec Johnson (1977).6
rate environment, since the purpose of this investigation is to observe direction and
magnitude of changes in coefficent values in the move from fixed to more flexible
rates.
II. Empirical Procedure
The use of instrumental variables was chosen over the construction of a
complex formal model for application to all fourteen countries analyzed here because
of data limitations and computational expense of fitting the entire model. While a
more complete model might be practical for application to a single country, problems
are compounded in a multicountry approach such as this. It is not clear, moreover,
that any single model would be appropriate institutionally for all countries.
Beginning with the monetary base identity, we know that
[1 )
where M is the base money stock, R is the level of international reserves, and D is
the domestic component of the base. It then follows that
AM = <'oR + ~D (2)
and sterilization and offset relationships respectively may be defined as:
~D = aO + al~R (3)
~R =bO + bl~D [4)
where theoretical1y -1 :sal .s.O and -1 s.. b
i '5-0. If the sterilization coefficient al is
near minus unity then independence from exogenous changes in international reserves
is indicated, since the domestic component of the base moves to neutralize them,
while nearness to zero indicates absence of such independence with foreign asset
flows being allowed by the monetary authorities to influence the monetary base. If
the offset coefficient b
i is near minus unity then any exogenous change in the
domestic component of the base is cancelled by international reserve movements
which the authorities find necessary in order to maintain an exchange rate target,
while nearness to zero is some evidence that such effects are negligible.7
Simultaneity bias in coefficients a1 and hI is obvious however, and as
mentioned in the previous section both offset and sterilization phenomena do not
occur in a vacuum but rather in relation to other targets of the monetary authorities.
For this reason liD and fIR were regressed on several variables hypothesized to enter
a monetary reaction function of the authorities, and the Iitted values resulting from
such _a process were then entered as independent variables in modifications of
equations (3) and (4) to estimate true offset and sterilization effects.
Five instrumental variables were chosen for their relevance in reaction
functions for the conduct of both domestic and international monetary policy. Each
is taken to be exogenous here reflecting the very short run nature of phenomena to be
investigated. Monetary authorities following a non-inflationary money growth
gUideline will wish to expand money in line with changes in real economic
activity.!1 Also, because unemployment reduction is often an overriding goal for
monetary policy, the authorities feel pressure to accommodate or validate exogenous
wage push pressure•.2l In addition to wage push there is also typically a IIgovernment
push" emanating from pressure on monetary authorities to finance the pUblic sector
deficit, in order to prevent higher interest rates and crowding out in domestic capital
markets. Specifically with respect to international reserve and exchange rate
management, balance of payments variables such as trade or current account flows
are exogenous here and obviously important. And the relationship of domestic prices
to foreign prices is also a proxy for pressures on both international reserves and the
exchange rate. Some monetary authorities under managed floating might even use
8. For an analysis which considers domestic income endogenous, see MiHer (1979),
who concludes that if domestic monetary expansion sufficiently stimulates
income in the short run the net effect may be an inflow rather than the more
typically assumed offsetting outflow of international reserves.
9. For a more detailed account of reasoning behind the inclusion of this variable
and empirical results for eight countries, see Gordon 0975 and 1977).8
perceived changes in purchasing power parity relationships as a guide to what an
appropriate exchange rate should be, even though such an approach has many
problems in application.
On the above reasoning, instruments for each country were specified as:
(1) Changes in real income, with lower frequency observations on GNP
distributed to monthly frequency on the basis of changes in the industrial
production index;
(2) percentage changes in a national wage index;
(3) the government budget deficit (surplus), cycllcally-adjusted in order to
abstract from a more simple synchronous correspondence of monetary and
fiscal policy over the economic cycle and in order to more properly capture
crowding out type pressure, by regressing the observed deficit on changes in
real GNP and seasonal dummy variables;
(4) the difference in nominal exports and imports, representative of balance of
payments effects;10/
(5) a ratio of the domestic consumer price index to the foreign consumer price
index, where the U.S. CPI is taken as a proxy for the foreign price level
variable·!11
10. Such a variable might have been defined as a more inclusive balance in the
external accounts, such as the current account balance or even a basic balance,
since in this short run time frame many capital flows also are exogenous. There
is some danger here, however, of including most of the important items in the
balance-of-payments other than liR, so that accounting relationships are the
primary reason for empirical correspondence, and we wish to avoid this.
Moreover, for some countries analyzed here monthly and even quarterly balance
of payments flows are not published, so that the chosen proxy is the only one
available.
11. Choice of the U.S. CPI as a proxy for the foreign price level might be more
obvious for the 'fixed rate period, when the U.S. dollar bilateral rate was
explicitly the focus of intervention. It is not clear, however, that any other
single bilateral rate, or national price level, would be more appropriate under
more flexible rates, since the U.S. dollar bilateral rate has remained an
important focus for exchange rate policy. Some experimentation with other
national price levels during the managed float, such as that of Germany for
joint float participants, did not yield overall results much different from those
reported here.9
All five of the above variables were used as instruments on both b.D and
lJ.R.12/ One might expect the first three to be more important in a reaction function
of the domestic component f&O and the last two to enter logically lnto a reaction
function for tR, but influences are hard to separate. The government deficit, for
example, also influences l!.R,13/ and income changes can influence fiR by both
current and capital account channels. A very small and open economy can find it
easier to manage its money supply by managing its external balance than by
manipulating the relatively much smaller domestic component of the base. By its
actions the country therefore manages the international component with domestic
targets in mind.
The first stage estimation utilized third degree polynomial distributed
lags unconstrained at both endse - Some experimentation was conducted on the
appropriate length of the lag at this stage, but generally it was taken to be six
12e AD and ~R were computed as the changes in the net domestic and net foreign
assets on the balance sheet of the monetary authorities. (A data refinement
that would be usefUl, and that frequently has been performed, is the adjustment
of the domestic component of the base for changes in required reserves.
Unfortunately this information is difficult to obtain for most countries included
here, and it was judged better to be as consistent as possible across countries
given the nature and purpose of the analysis.) The source for practically all
data was the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
(IFS)e One exception was the wage index for some countries, which was taken
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Main
Economic Indicators when an hourly wage rate index was not available in the
former sourcee Monthly data was taken for all countries except the UeKe, for
which the components of the monetary base were only available quarterlYe (It
was also necessary occasionally to go directly to national sources, such as for
data on the Canadian budget deficit which was only available over a very short
interval in IFS. Data tapes of Data Resources Incorporated, Lexington,
Massachusetts, were utilized for all other series.)
13. See Borts and Hanson (1977).10
~ .....
months. Fitted values 6R and 60 were then entered into equations (3) and (4)
modified to account for lagged offset or sterilization responses 14/ as
n A
AD. =b • I bj 6Dt _i '"t; - 0 1=0
(5)
(6)
In U) and (6) a six month third degree polynomial was estimated initially. These
.",results were then inspected and the Jag'was truncated at the point at which estimated
Jag coefficients became-weak asjudged by their standard errors.. The equation was
then re-estimated with a polynomial of the -degree that seemed most appropriate.
nus varied in practice from a linear(first degree)l'olynomial to a third degreeone.·
Equations U) and-(6).were run over the entire period of available data, and.
then re-run over the.!ixed rate and.morellexible rate intervals,,"eparateiy. A Chow
test was.performedin\allcases'''lQ·\·determineewhether the_structural' "hift was
statistica11y'significant;tS/c'TJ!e monthafter.the·finalJ>reakwith.theU.S. '.dollar was
taken to demi?rcatethe transition to managedlloating for the various countries. No
single date is applicable to-all -of them of course. Canada was first among major
countries to 'float independently..:::in the·seventies,breaking.:ihe-fixede.-ties thatit-had-
maintained with th~ U.S. dollar since 1962~-- -This move-occurred on- May~31-,":1970.
Speculation against the-pound sterling forced its independent floatation by the United
14. For an approach -that analyzes Jagged responses between Rand D and their
implications for observed countemporaneous relationships between the two, see
Phaup and Kusinitz (1977).
15. See Chow (1961).II
Kingdom on June 23, 1972.16/ Early 1973 marked the final end of adjustably pegged
rates for most countries investigated here, as the overvaluation of the dol1ar even
after its December 1971 Smithsonian devaluation of ten percent became too much to
bear.ll! The Swiss National Bank suspended intervention on January 23, 1973. The
foHowing month, on February 13 and 14, respectively, Italy and Japan announced that
margins vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar would not be observed•.!!! On March 19, 1973, the
link with the U.S. currency was severed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.19! Also
in March 1973 Austria announced that no margins would be maintained formally for
any currency.201 Australia remained fixed to the U.S. dollar until September 25,
1974.21/
16. The United Kingdom quite briefly participated in the European Common
Margins Agreement from May to June of 1972. On the above date however it
floated against both the U.S. dollar and snake currencies.
17. Some countries had floated briefly against the dollar as a result of monetary
crises in 1971, but returned to fixed parities with the Smithsonian Agreement.
Since this interval did not truly represent the final break with the doBar and
was really quite short, it is included within the fixed rate period for applicable
countries.
18. For Italy this also marked withdrawal from the European snake, in which it had
participated since April 1972.
19. All of these countries continued to float together as part of European joint
float, which had been in existence formally since the Basle Agreement of April
10, 1972, among Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom and Denmark joined on
May 1, 1972 and Norway on May 23. As noted above, the U.K. left in June 1972
and Italy in February 1973. Denmark left on June 22, 1972 but returned the
following October 10. Sweden did not join until the break with the U.S. dollar
on March 19, 1973, remaining in until August 29, 1977. France withdrew on
January 19, 1974, returned on July 10, 1975, but then withdrew again on March
15, 1976. (Other countries have revalued or devalued within the snake but have
continued to participate.) See Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(1976), and International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange
Restrictions, various issues.
20. Austria has not participated in the European snake formalJy, but this country de
facto and without obligations observed margins for the schilling of 2.25 percent
either side of cross-parity against snake participants until May 17, 1974, when
it widened the band to 4.5 percent either side of cross-parities.
21. After this time a trade-weighted system determined daily the exchange rate to
be maintained, in a fashion which kept the value of the weighted basket
constant.12
While this was sufficient for comparing shifts in offset coefficients to
test the hypothesis that the move allowed greater or less leeway for authorities to
manipulate domestic money bases without having to intervene because of exchange
rate effects of these domestic changes, it still left something to be desired in the
calculation of sterilization coefficients that judge the extent to which reserve flows,
from the other direction, themselves affect monetary policy. This is primarily
because included in the fixed rate interval is that period in the early 1970's when
massive accumulations due to the overvaluation of the U.S. doHar are alleged to have
caused a shift in abilities of dollar peggers to sterilize. With respect to the
sterilization coefficient then, one actuaHy has three interesting sub intervals: that
through the end of the sixties decade, that from the early seventies until the advent
of managed floating, and that after greater flexibility began.
The· division between the second two sterilization periods was discussed
above, but to separate the first two is somewhat arbitrary and can depend on
individual countries. Looking at each country entails looking at the actual changes in
international reserves in the period surrounding the reserve buildup, and one faces the
methodological conflict of aHowing the data itself to dictate research procedure.
Figure 1 indicates, however, that for the aggregate of industrialized countries the
bUildup in foreign exchange reserves was sharply higher beginning in 1970. Results to
be presented below for the sterilization coefficients of investigated co_untries
therefore include two tests for a significant shift in their values: one which simply
compares results before and after the break with the U.S. dollar, and one which
compares the interval ending with the last observation in 1969 to that after the above
break.
The sample of fourteen countries chosen here includes the major
industrialized nations with the kinds of currencies and capital markets which make13
analysis of these effects interesting and important. Although some verifications of
the monetary approach have been applied to the United States,22! this country was
excluded from the sample. As the world's primary reserve currency country the
United States finances it balance-of-payments primarily by changes in liabilities to
official foreigners rather than by changes in its own monetized reserves.23!
V. Results
Results from equation (5) and (6) for all countries are presented in Tables_
2 through 15. The lag structures estimated as explained in the previous section
generally do not extend past three periods. While it is possible that effects could be
felt past these periods, they did not appear as significant here.
Offset coefficient lags are generally greater than sterilization
coefficients lags, which is not surprising. One might expect the effects of domestic
component movements on international reserves to be dissipated more slowly. The
fact that sterilization coefficients usually have a shorter lag structure may be
reasonable since unwanted foreign asset variations can be recognized immediately by
the authorities. Steps can be taken to reverse them, if this is possible at all, by
opposite movements of the domestic component of the base in the period in which
they occur or shortly thereafter.
There are actually two channels through which -the offset can operate.
Newly created money can cause money supply to exceed money demand in the
economy generally, so that non-money real and financial assets are substituted for
22. See luan and Miller (I979).
23. See Darby (I978). The point at which to divide the interval between fixed and
more flexible rates would also not be clear and would not have the same
meaning for the United States, since for the other countries this point was
taken to be that at which they ceased to peg to the U.S. dol1ar and de facto
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money both domestically and internationally. To the extent that this drives the
external current and capital accounts into deficit, a loss of official reserves is
forthcoming, but this may take some time to occur, and temporal response of the
current and the capital accounts can be different. The other channel is a more direct
one caused by exchange markets discounting the money supply increase
instantaneously. This channel would basically be the same as that under the view
that exchange rates are determined in an asset market, such as has been expostulated
under the flexible rate variant of the monetary approach. If an increase in the
domestic component caused an instantaneous downward pressure on the exchange
rate in line with an asset approach, authorities which resist such movements with
intervention could lose reserves more immediately via this route as well as the
former one.
The lag structure for Japan's offset coefficient presents an interesting
lllustration of these two offset channels. In the concurrent period the coefficient is
large, perhaps an indication of the second channel mentioned. It then decreases but
rises again in the fifth and sixth lagged months when effects from the first channel
perhaps are felt. Japan is the only country here that demonstrates this structure,
however, and an inspection of the strength of estimated lagged coefficients for the
postfloat period indicates that a basic change in the lag structure may have occurred.
For Japan an alternative lag structure that seems to fit the postfloat period
somewhat better is also presented.
The estimated sum of individual lags, the total offset or sterilization
coefficient, usually falls between zero and minus one as hypothesized. In the one
case in which it is positive (the prefloat to end-1969 sterilization coefficient for
Australia) it is quite insignificant (perhaps indicating that there was no attempt by
this country to sterilize in this period rather than that reserve flows were15
unimportant). Occasionally the estimated absolute values of these coefficients are
greater than one, but they are always within a standard error of minus unity except
for the postfloat sterilization coefficients of France and the United Kingdom (which
causes the total interval's sterilization estimate also to be outside of a standard error
of one in both cases), and both the total prefJoat and the postfJoat sterilization
coefficient for Japan.
In many cases the offset and sterilization coefficients presented in the
tables are close to estimates found by others for given countries, but in some cases
they are not. Across the spectrum of previous work, however, not only the interval
of estimation but also the basic methodology often differs. For example, effects on
the current and capital accounts have sometimes been computed separately.
Table 16 summarizes the direction of movement of offset coefficients in
going from prefloat to postfloat,ilfld movements from both pre-1970 and pre-1972
sterilization coefficients to the postf10at estimates. Cases in which the Chow test
indicates a statistically significant shift are also shown.
For the offset coefficient, the direction of movement from the prefloat
to the postfloat period is nonuniform. For some countries,there is little change at
aU. Australia's computed offset moves downward marginally but both estimates are
close to minus unity, indicating little ability to conduct an independent monetary
policy. Austria's offset coefficient is exactly the same for the prefloat and pQstfloat
periods.
Countries that show a statisticaUy significant downward movement in the
offset coefficient from prefloat to postfloat periods are Canada, Germany, Japan,
and Switzerland. Canada's post-1970 offset coefficient falls to -.15 from -.48 before
floating, but the postfloat coefficient is not significant. Both the prefloat and
postfloat offset coefficients for Germany are significant, and the value falls fromTABLE 16 - Direction -of Absolute Value Movement o~ Coefficient
from Adjustable Peg to Managed Floating Period
OFFSET STERILLZATION
From period prior From total fixed rate
to end - 1969 to period to
managed float to managed float
Australia Down Up* Up
Austria NC Up' Up
Belgium Up Up Up
Canada Down* Up' N/A
Denmark Up' NC NC
France Up' Up' Up'
Germany Down* Up Up
Italy Up' Up Up
Japan Down* Up Up
Netherlands Up' Up' Up'
Norway Up' Up* Up
Sweden Up Up Up
Switzerland Down* Up Up
United Kindgdom Up Up' Up'
* Chow test significant at 95% level.
NC ::: No change
t ::: Both prefloat intervals are essentially the same for Canada, which
floated in May, 1970.16
close to minus unity to -.47, indicating a good bit more ability to achieve a domestic
monetary target without counteractive movements in the international component of
the monetary base. The same cannot be said for other participants in the European
joint float, as discussed below. Japan's offset coefficient results are similar to
Germany, moving from minus unity to -.34 (or -.15 using the above mentioned
alternative lag structure), as are Switzerland's to an extent which move from -.81 to
-.34. This group includes two of the world's most important trading currencies behind
the U.S.dollar, the deutschmark and the yen, and two currencies that are often
mentioned as havens of "hot money" or speculative short-term capital flows, the
mark and the Swiss franc. The insignificance of Canada's postfloat estimate prevents
firm conclusions regarding thatcountry.,24/ but for the others the evidence seems to
support the ~fficacy of flexible rates in imparting monetary independence. All of
these countries except for Germany, it may be noted, float independently of other
countrieso _
On the other hand, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway
have offset coefficients- that move upward significantly from the prefloat to the
postfloat-periods. Tbeoffsetcoefficlents of-three_other countries-Belgium, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom--rlse in the move to generalized floating, but the shift isoot
significant as measured by the Chow test. For some of these countries the loss of
offset independence appears dramatic. Denmark's coefficient rises to -.92 from-.40;
Italy's-from -an almost negligible -.09 to -.91, the Netherlands' from -.28 to -.84, and
Norway's from -.51 to -.97. Others seem to have at least some monetary
independence even after the postfJoat rise. France, Belgium, Sweden, and the United
24. For some evidence that floating has resulted in greater monetary independence
for Canada, see Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1979).17
Kingdom have postfloat offset values of -.46, -.60, -.47 and -.67 respectively. An
interesting point concerning aU countries in this group, however, is tha.t most of them
are, or have been during the floating rate interval, participants in the European
snake. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden participated over
the entire flexible rate interval taken here, and so did France for a considerable
portion of it. (The fact that France was out during much of the floating interval may
be one reason its offset coefficient is still relatively low after floating.)
The other two countries whose offset coefficients move upward from
fixed to floating rates, Italy and the United Kingdom, were not associated with the
snake in the latter interval. The currencies of both of these countries were weak
over this period, however, reflecting generally higher rates of domes~icinflation than
abroad. In this sense it is not surprising that exchange markets may have reacted
strongly to money supply increases that could augur future inflation by selling the lira
or the pound. Insomuch as this activated official intervention to shore up the falling
currency, the offset to the original monetary expansion could easily have occurred.
The dominance of European snake members in the group of countries that
lost offset independence in moving to generalized floating underlines the apparently
high cost of participation in such a currency union. It is also noteworthy that
Germany, the major snake member, gains offset independence in the floating
interval. If movements in the deutschmark dictate overall movement of the snake,
then it is not surprising that Germany would gain monetary independence while other
members, who sometimes must struggle to match their currency's movement to the
mark, would lose independence. These results indicate that, differences in
institutional arrangements notwithstanding, matching movements in the deutschmark
has had a greater cost in terms of monetary independence than pegging to the dollar
under Bretton Woods.18
Moving now to sterilization coefficient results, a more consistent picture
emerges across countries. In almost a11 cases the absolute value of the sterilization
coefficient rises in the move ~o generalized floating, indicating greater ability of
foreign monetary authorities to neutralize unwanted official reserve flows" This
greater independence seems to operate in both directions, applying to those weaker
currency countries that have lost reserves as well as the stronger currency countries·
that have gained reserves. Greater ability (or desire) to sterilize applies, moreover,
both to- .the movement from the total prefloat period and to movement from the
before-l-970 prefloat interval. The coefficient shifts in moving from the total
adjustable peg interval to managed floating are discussed below first.
The change in the sterilization coefficient in moving from prefloat to
postfloat is less dramatic for some countries than others. Denmark's coefficient is
_almost exactly the same. Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and
Switzerland also do not-demonstrate observably large shifts. All of these countries
except for Switzerland indicate a considerable ability to sterilize before the float as
well as after. __!Switzerland's coefficient changes from -.04 to -.17, and while this
may be a noticeable shift, it still marks this economy as more vulnerable to foreign
monetary flows than any others investigated here.) Prefloat sterilization coefficients
of -.60 for Belgium--and -.64 for Germany are lower than most.- Canada-and Sweden
have prefloat coefficients that are quite close to minus one, and Japan's' coefficient
for this-interval--as--mentioned above even exceeds minus unity by more than one
standard error. Canada's prefloat coefficient of -1.14 and postfloat coefficient of
-1.28 are both within a standard error of minus one, and the shift is not so great, but
the Chow test indicates-that this change is significant. Perhaps this is related to an
apparent change in the lag structure, similar to that discussed above for Japan
1s
offset. Using a second degree polynomial to fit both lag structures, a monotonically19
declining distribution is observed in the earlier interval and one that rises and then
falls is observed in the postfJoat period.
For other countries the upward movement in the sterilization coefficient's
absolute value is more noticeable. This is true for Australia, Austria, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and to some extent for Norway. In only four
cases, however, does the Chow test judge the shift to be statistically significant at
the 95 percent level. In addition to the Canadian result mentioned above, these
countries are France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
In moving from interval truncated at the end of 1969 to the postfloat
period, there are a total of seven cases (also including Canada, to which the 1970-
1972 period does not apply here since it actually floated in 1970) in which the Chow
test indicates a significant upward shift. These are Australia, Austria, Canada,
_France, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. One would expect fewer,
not more, cases here than for the interval including the 1970-1972 period of U.S.
dollar overvaluation if this latter episode was important in fostering massive reserve
inflows which dollar peggers could not neutralize. This result might be taken on the
surface to indicate that the official reserve accumulations of the early seventies
were less of a problem than some have argued.25/ Only for the Netherlands does one
find a smaller absolute value for the sterilization estimate in the total fixed rate
interval (-.48) than for the pre-1970 interval (-.73). This kind of result for more
countries might have supported an argument that neutralization of the 1970-1972
reserve inflows was attempted but that it met with little success due to insufficient
depth of domestic capital markets relative to the foreign flows.
25. See, for example, Goldstein (974), Meiselman (975), and Heller (976).20
Considerably more of the sterilization coefficient estimates in the pre-
1970 interval are statistically weak. Low t-statistics characterize Australia, Austria,
Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom in this period. A reason for this
coud be that some of these countries simply did not attempt to sterilize reserve flows
in this period, reacting more passively to them and alloWing them to automatically
influence the base money stock.26/ As reserve accumulations grew in the early
seventies, a greater awareness of their magnitude and liquidity effects could have
caused a more active effort to counter them by opposite movements in the domestic
component of the monetary base.
VI. Conclusions
Overall results of the presented tests of greater national monetary
..independence under managed floating are summarized below.
(1) Offset coefficients show a mixed picture across countries regarding the
extent to which official reserve flows counteract exogenous opposite
26. This may be less likely for the United Kingdom than for other countries. On the
U.K. policy of reqUiring that any pounds obtained by the Exchange Stabilization
Fund be used to purchase government bonds, so that there is a tendency toward
automatic sterilization, see Hodgeman (1974, p. 173).
The at least quasi-reserve center status of the United Kingdom during the
adjustable peg era, it can be argued, may have made international reserve asset
influences negligible enough to be ignored. In work which relates to this aspect,
Putnam and Wilford (1978) have concluded that failure to find a causal role for
U.K. money on U.K. nominal income, such as Sims (1972) found for the United
States, could be understandable. If the U.S. as the major reserve center is
insulated from foreign monetary influences since there are no significant
effects of changes in international reserve assets on its monetary base, they
argue, it has control over its money stock and this leads nominal income. But in
an outer country (the U.K. here) money and income are simultaneously
determined because the economy is more open and has prices set in llunified
world markets" (ibid., pp. 425-426). Such a view does not weigh very heavily
the reserve center status of the U.K. under Bretton Woods. Mixon, Pratt, and
Wallace (1979), on the other hand, taking a cross-national approach of U.S.
money to U.K. nominal income, find no causal relationship under Bretton Woods
but do find one under the managed float. They therefore question whether
more flexible rates have actually insulated U.K. income from U.S. monetary
polley. But results in Table 15 at least support a case that the U.K. has
actually sterilized more since floating.21
movements in the domestic component of the monetary base. More offset
coefficients move upward than downward, indicating less independence under
managed floating, but the independent floaters generaUy show downward
movement (Canada, Japan and Switzerland significantly). One participant in the
European joint float, Germany, also shows a significant downward movement.
Other snake members show less offset independence as participants in this
currency union than they did when they fixed their currencies to the dollar. This
emphasizes the deutschmark as the most important key currency in the snake, and
suggests that other snake members must match movements in the German currency
rather than vice versa. While it is true that the mutual band within which snake
currencies move is marginally wider under managed floating than it was when all
currencies pegged to the dollar,27/ considerable intervention frequently has been
conducted. More divergent price levels and generally more turbulent underlying
economic conditions have imparted much volatility to exchange rates. What is
important here may not be the width of the band but rather how far outside of it
private supply and demand for a given currency find instantaneous equilibrium,
creating a wider gap to be filled by official intervention.
(2) There does appear to be greater ability for all countries to sterilize
exogenous by opposite movements in the domestic component of the monetary base
under managed floating than under the adjustable U.S. dollar pegging system.
27. When U.S. dollar parity was maintained intervention occurred within a margin
of approximately.:!:. .75 percent, allowing a maximum difference in cross rates
of .:!:. 1.5 percent. The Smithsonian Agreement in 1971 changed these figures to
.:!:. 2.25 percent and.:!:. 4.5 percent respectively, prompting the institution of the
Basle Agreement in April 1972 which halved the last figure (the tunnel) to 2.25
percent (the snake). In March 1973 the tunnel ceased to exist but the snake
remained. In the total process the maximum difference in snake country cross
rates had widened to.:!:. 2.25 percent from.:!:. 1.5 percent.22
(3) Some evidence presented here suggests that greater actual sterilization
occurred in the early seventies episode, when the overvalued U.S~ doUar caused
larger official reserve inflows to countries still pegging to the U.S. unit, than
occurred during most of the sixties when reaction to such flows may have been
more passive.
On balance these results do point to greater overall monetary
independence under managed floating than existed under fixed rates. They also
highlight the fact that it cannot be an automatic presumption, as is illustrated by the
offset coefficient results for joint float participants (except for Germany) and some
other countries. The policy prescription for these cases is not that managed floating
does not work, but it should be recognized that certain tradeoffs still exist between
monetary independence and some forms of exchange rate fixity.28!
28. Others have reached similar conclusions in comparing managed floating to fixed
rates. Frenkel (1978), investigates the demand for international reserves during
-1963-72-as-compared-to--1-973-75,-and concludes-that-"economic-behavior seems
to be -more--stablecthan legalarrangements" (p. 18). The offset coefficient
results presented here generally do not conflict with the conclusions on reserve
use under different exchange rate regimes by Suss (1976), who finds that
Canada,--Denmark, France, West Germany, Japan, and Switzerland indicate
reduced reserve use under floating, but that Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway
increased reserve use. Results her-e,-which find -lower offsets -corresponding to
the above countries that showed less reserve use and higher offsets for
countries indicating greater reserve use, agree except for Denmark and France.References
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